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TORTS - TORT OF BAD FAITH IN FIRST PARTY ACTIONS
RECOGNIZED. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms
Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984).
Broadway Arms Corporation sued its insurer, Aetna Casualty and
Surety Company, alleging that Aetna committed the tort of bad faith
in its handling of Broadway Arms' claim under a fire insurance policy.
Aetna appealed from a jury verdict finding that Aetna had acted in
bad faith and assessing compensatory damages of $175,000 and puni-
tive damages of $5,000,000.
The fire occurred on August 22, 1981, and forced the shut-down of
Broadway Arms' gun shop. Several days after the fire, Aetna advanced
Broadway Arms $30,000, as partial payment on the loss. The parties
became embroiled in a dispute over the ownership of salvage from the
fire and relations between Broadway Arms and Aetna deteriorated.
Aetna offered $63,225 for settlement of all claims under the policy.1
Broadway Arms rejected this offer and filed suit on December 4, 1981.2
At trial, Broadway Arms argued that Aetna was guilty of bad
faith because of (1) its refusal to pay policy limits under the fire cover-
age; (2) its failure to release the salvage to insured; and (3) a threat by
Aetna to report the amount of Broadway Arms' claimed losses to the
Internal Revenue Service. On appeal, Aetna argued that the Arkansas
I. The insurance policy included basic coverage for business property losses up to $75,000; a
provision for an automatic 25% increase in the basic coverage during a specified peak season; and
coverage for earnings lost during any shut-down occasioned by fire. See Supplemental Abstract
and Brief for Appellee at 1-2, Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark.
128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984).
2. Broadway Arms employed attorney Roger Glasgow to handle negotiations with Aetna.
Prior to trial, Glasgow determined that his testimony as to Aetna's actions in handling Broadway
Arms' claims might be necessary to establish bad faith. Accordingly, Glasgow associated attorney
Gary Eubanks to handle the case, agreeing to split a contingent fee. Glasgow withdrew as attor-
ney of record, but he continued to represent Broadway Arms in other suits brought against it, and
was designated corporate representative for Broadway Arms, sitting at counsel table during the
course of the trial of the suit against Aetna. See Supplemental Abstract and Brief for Appellee at
52-56, Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463
(1984). The court held that Glasgow, under the circumstances of the case, should not have been
permitted to testify. In so holding, the court reaffirmed its position that a lawyer with an interest
in the outcome of a case should not be allowed to participate as a witness. However, the court
directed that Glasgow should be allowed to testify upon retrial of the case, provided that he with-
draw completely from the conduct of the case. For Glasgow's account of the lawsuit and of his
own role in it, see Glasgow, First Party Bad Faith Comes to Arkansas, 18 ARKANSAS LAWYER 48
(1984).
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Trade Practices Act 8 and the penalty and fees statute4 preempted the
bad faith cause of action, and that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that violation of the Trade Practices Act was evidence of bad
faith.5
The Arkansas Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Purtle, rejected Aetna's argument that the statutory enactments6 which
regulate the insurance industry within the state preempt the bad faith
cause of action in tort. The court held that the bad faith cause of ac-
tion is viable in first party as well as in third party cases. In first party
actions the bad faith tort requires a showing of affirmative misconduct
by an insurer which is dishonest, malicious or oppressive. However, the
court reversed and remanded the case, finding that the trial court erro-
neously instructed the jury as to the implications of the Trade Practices
Act.7 The court stated that the trial judge omitted an important part of
the statutory language in his instruction,8 and further held that the in-
struction should not have stated that violation of the Act is evidence of
bad faith. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp.,
281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984).
Disputes arising between insured and insurer have traditionally
been governed by the law of contract.9 Accordingly, an insured seeking
to recover against the insurer for simple breach of contract is con-
fronted at the outset by the well-established principle that only those
consequences of the breach which were forseeable at the time of the
making of the contract are compensable.1 0 Applied to the contract of
3. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3001 to -3014 (1980).
4. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1980).
5. Aetna also argued that (1) the trial court erred in allowing Glasgow to testify; (2) the
damages awarded were excessive and not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the trial
court erred in failing to grant a new trial upon Aetna's proffer of affidavits from two jurors show-
ing jury prejudice.
6. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3001 to -3014 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1980).
7. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3001 to -3014 (1980).
8. See infra notes 113, 114 and accompanying text. The trial judge omitted a prefatory sec-
tion which states: "Committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general busi-
ness practice, any of the following .... " ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(9) (1980).
9. See, e.g., Moss v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 385 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Mo.
1974); Guthrie v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 837 (D.S.C. 1968); Hamner v.
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 49 Ala. App. 214, 270 So.2d 87 (1972); Dodd v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 373 Mass. 72, 365 N.E.2d 802 (1977); St. Joseph Transfer & Storage Co. v. Employers'
Indem. Corp., 224 Mo. App. 221, 23 S.W.2d 215 (1930); McDonald v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co.,
109 N.J.L. 308, 162 A. 620 (1932).
10. This principle was first recognized in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.
1854), and is today the guiding tenet for courts awarding damages for breach of contract. See J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-5 (2d ed. 1977). The rule set forth in
Hadley limits recovery for breach of contract to those elements of harm which were reasonably
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indemnity between insurer and insured, this familiar rule of contract
law has meant that the insured's damages are limited to the amount of
the policy, plus interest.11
In an ordinary insurance claim case, the applicable law of contract
would bar recovery for such "unforseeable" consequential damages as
emotional distress or mental anguish resulting from the breach." Even
claimed pecuniary losses, such as loss of business profits, could be de-
nied compensation in those jurisdictions taking the strict view that re-
covery for breach of an insurance contract should be held to policy
limits.1 3 Nor are punitive damages ordinarily allowed for breach of
contract, no matter how willful, malicious or fraudulent the breach.14
Such limitations on the recoverable damages stemming from
breach of an insurance contract sometimes resulted in harsh decisions
15
and placed the insured at a distinct disadvantage in a dispute over set-
tlement of a policy claim. In situations where the amount of the claim
was small and the financial resources of the insured limited, the insur-
ance company often could force a settlement below the policy limit
simply by delaying action on the claim. 6
contemplated by both parties as likely to result from a breach. 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
I I. See Parks, Recovery of Extra-Contract Damages in Suits on Insurance Policies, 9 Fo-
RUM 42 (1973).
12. E.g., Jefferson County Burial Soc. v. Curry, 237 Ala. 548, 187 So. 723 (1939) (recovery
for breach of burial policy limited to damages not exceeding the stipulated value of burial services
to be rendered despite allegations as to consequential damages suffered including mental distress);
Clark v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 245 Ky. 579, 53 S.W.2d 968 (1932) (breach of burial insur-
ance policy did not allow recovery of consequential damages for mental anguish when there was
no physical injury).
13. E.g., Marvex Processing & Finishing Corp. v. Allendale Mutual Ins., 91 Misc. 2d 683,
398 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1977).
14. E.g., Otto v. Imperial Casualty and Indem. Co., 277 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1960); McDowell
v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 404 F. Supp. 136 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Cassady v. United Ins. Co. of
Am., 370 F. Supp. 388 (W.D. Ark. 1974); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Coburn, 132 Ga. App. 859,
209 S.E.2d 655 (1974); Higgins v. Blue Cross of W. Iowa and S. Dakota, 319 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa
1982). But see State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798 (1974) (punitive
damages can be assessed in a breach of contract action if there is a showing of malice or reckless
or wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights); See also, Curtis v. Partain, 272 Ark. 400, 614 S.W.2d
671 (1981) (indicating that punitive damages may be recovered for a breach of contract that is
willful, malicious or oppressive).
15. See, e.g., Meridian Mutual Ins. Co. v. McMullen, 152 Ind. App. 141, 282 N.E.2d 558
(1972). There the court refused to allow the insured to recover damages beyond the amount due
under a fire insurance policy. The insured claimed that the failure of his insurer to pay promptly
for fire loss to his home resulted in his losing a job and contracting heart disease and ulcers. The
court held that as a matter of law such damages were not recoverable in a breach of contract
action because they were too remote and not within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at
the time of the making of the contract.
16. Insurers always have had nearly insurmountable control over insureds. They wrote
the policies; they interpreted the policies; they knew the policies inside and out; they
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Dissatisfaction with the recovery limitations imposed under a
traditional contract approach led counsel for plaintiffs to press their
claims to extra-contractual damages on a variety of legal theories.17
Some courts responded by adopting a liberal view of the for-
seeability requirement for consequential damages, thus allowing recov-
ery by the insured for damages in excess of policy limits.18 Other courts
awarded extra-contractual damages based upon proof of an indepen-
dent tort, including that of fraud,' 9 intentional infliction of emotional
distress,20 and bad faith.2'
These differing approaches, one proceeding in contract, the other
in tort, might naturally be expected to generate some confusion as to
the principles to be applied in an insurance case where extra-contrac-
tual damages are sought. Where the claimed basis for extra-contrac-
tual recovery is bad faith, the problem of mixed contract and tort theo-
ries is exacerbated. It is the breach of a duty created by contract (that
of good faith and fair dealing in handling claims) which gives rise to
the cause of action in tort.22 Thus, the basis for the so-called "new
tort" of bad faith in insurance cases is a combination of tort and con-
tract principles.23
The contractually created duty of good faith and fair dealing,
had the insured's money; and they dictated the decisions to pay or deny claims. Indeed,
the mere submission of an insurance claim was an admission of vulnerability on the
part of the insured and an invitation to the insurer to take advantage of the insured in
bargaining for payment of less than that due under the policy.
Levinson, Thoughts on Trying a Plaintiffis Extracontractual Damages Case, A.B.A. SEC. TORT
AND INS. PRACTICE 139, 141 (1983).
17. See Insurer's Bad Faith, 31 AM. JUR. POF2d 333, 334.
18. See, e.g., Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978),
where the court, while refusing to recognize a basis in tort for recovery of extra-contractual dam-
ages, nevertheless permitted an insured to recover financial losses resulting from the insurer's fail-
ure to pay benefits due under a fire insurance policy on grounds that such injuries were a foresee-
able consequence of the insurer's breach.
19. See, e.g., Old Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 295 Ala. 235, 326 So.2d 726 (1976);
Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
20. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that
Illinois law would permit recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress); Fletcher v.
Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
21. See, e.g., Noble v. Nat'l American Life Ins. Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 624 P.2d 866 (1981);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal Rptr. 480 (1973).
22. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973).
23. Zurek, First Party Insurance: Claims, Practices and Procedures in Light of Extra-Con-
tractual Damage Actions, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 666, 667 (1978). The intertwining of tort and con-
tract theories in this area of the law has led one commentator to declare that "tortious breach of
contract," despite its contradictory implications, is the best description for the bad faith cause of
action. J. MCCARTHY. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES § 1.7 (3d ed. 1983).
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upon which the tort of bad faith is based, has not always been recog-
nized by the courts as part of the obligations naturally arising out of a
contract of insurance. 4 The earliest cases2 5 to recognize such a con-
tract duty involved third party claims in liability insurance cases, i.e.,
disputes between an insurer and its insured over the manner in which
the insurer had handled, settled or failed to settle claims made against
the insured by third parties. 6
The origin of the concept as it is applied today in first and third
party insurance cases is generally traced to a 1914 New York decision,
Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co.2 7 In Brassil, the insurance company
refused an offer from a third party suing its insured to settle the claim
for $1,500, the amount of the policy. A judgment was entered against
the insured for $6,000. The insurance company refused to appeal the
judgment, but offered to pay its insured the amount of the policy. The
insured thereupon hired his own attorney and won a reversal. He then
sued the insurer to recover his legal costs. The Brassil court held that
the insurer had violated an obligation of good faith which underlies all
contracts and was therefore liable for the expenses which the insured
had incurred in prosecuting the appeal. 8
24. For example, in the context of liability insurance, where an insured was sued by a third
party, the early cases often stated that an insurer was under no duty to accept an offer to settle
the claim within policy limits. Under this view, neither a negligent nor a bad faith refusal to
accept a settlement offer would subject the insurer to liability. E.g., Rumford Falls Paper Co. v.
Fidelity and Casualty Co., 92 Me. 574, 43 A. 503 (1899); C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 A. 653 (1914). Contrast this approach to the one taken in
Johansen v. California State Auto Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 288 (1975), which seems to border on strict liability for refusal by an insurer to settle a
third party claim following an offer that is within the policy limits.
25. E.g., Manhattan Fire Ins. Co. v. Weill & Ullman, 69 Va. (28 Gratt.) 389 (1877); Ger-
mania Ins. Co. v. Rudwig, 80 Ky. 223 (1882).
26. See Karp, Extracontractual Damages In Property Insurance Cases: A Defense Lawyer's
View, A.B.A. SEC. TORT AND INS. PRACTICE 79, 83 (1983).
27. 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
28. Ironically, the declaration in Brassil of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit
in the contract of insurance seems to have been prompted, at least in part, by the arguments of
the insurer that the insured was obligated to deal fairly and in good faith with the insurance
company. As the court noted in Brassil,
Even the defendant has invoked this implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing
not expressed in the terms of its written contract, for by its answer it has set forth that
it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to "deal fairly and in good faith . . . and that he
should not voluntarily or knowingly do any acts which would impose or tend to impose
on him or on this defendant a loss in the premises." If this was the plaintiff's duty, it
was not less the correlative obligation of the defendant to "deal fairly and in good
faith" with him.
210 N.Y. at 237, 104 N.E. at 624. This passage of the court's opinion prompted one lawyer
practicing in the field to comment that "it seems the insurance industry was hoist with its own
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Brassil illustrates several factors important to an analysis of the
origins of the bad faith cause of action in tort. First, it shows the con-
tractual genesis for the action, and second, it serves to demonstrate the
important distinction which must be made between first party and third
party actions in considering the tort of bad faith.2 9 Brassil is the root
decision in a long line of cases holding the insurer liable in excess of
policy limits for a bad faith refusal to accept a reasonable offer of set-
tlement in the third party claim setting.30 Extra-contractual liability
based on the breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a
first party insurance case is a relatively recent development, 31 and one
which is conceptually an extension of the doctrine of good faith as ap-
plied in the third party cases.32 Accordingly, it is important to preface
a consideration of the tort of bad faith in first party cases with a review
of the major decisions in the third party actions, from which the theory
of good faith and fair dealing arose.
The principle that an insurer, by reason of the contract of insur-
ance, owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its handling of pol-
icy claims and settlements is widely recognized in the context of third
party claims.33 Extra-contractual damages for breach of such a duty
petard." Miller, Living With Bad Faith, 46 INS. COUNSEL J. 34, 34 (1979).
29. [C]ourts have only recently distinguished first and third party policies in fashioning
excess liability law. The basic distinction noted is that first party excess liability de-
pends upon wrongful denial of coverage while most third party liability depends upon
the reasonableness of the insurer's rejection of an offer to settle within the policy limits.
The reasonableness standard imposed upon third party insurers requires of them a
higher duty of care than is required of first party insurers who must only avoid wrong-
ful actions. In third party situations, the insurer is faced with the dilemma of settling
and thereby assuming payment of the claim, or litigating and thereby exposing the
insured to personal liability as well as exposing itself to excess liability for failure to
settle reasonably.
Holmes, Third Party Insurance Excess Liability and its Avoidance, 34 ARK. L. REV. 525, 527
(1981).
30. See Annot., 40 A.L.R. 2d 168, 178-80 (1955).
31. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am. 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968)
has been cited as the initial case finding an insurer liable for a judgment in excess of policy limits
in a first party action. Holmes, supra note 29, at 526. However, the extra-contractual award in
Wetherbee was based on a showing of fraud. It was not until 1973 that a court based an award of
extra-contractual damages in a first party case upon the finding of a bad faith tort. Gruenberg v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal Rptr. 480 (1973).
32. See DuBois & Bronson, The Spectre of Punitive Damages in First Party Actions (pts. I
& 2), 40 INS. COUNSEL J. 290 (1973), 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 242 (1975); Note, First Party Torts -
Extra Contractual Liability of Insurers Who Violate the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,
25 DRAKE L. REV. 900 (1976).
33. See Annot., 40 A.L.R. 2d 168, 178-80 (1955) for an extensive annotation of cases from
the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions.
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were awarded in court decisions as early as 1915. 3"
In Arkansas, the question of whether an insurer could be held lia-
ble for a bad faith refusal to settle a claim against the insured was first
addressed in the 1954 case of Home Indemnity Co. v. Snowden.35
The insurer in Snowden had issued a liability policy in the amount
of $5,000 covering accidents arising out of Snowden's operation of a
frozen food locker business. During installation of a refrigerator com-
pressor at one of Snowden's plants, a refrigeration man was killed. The
widow offered to settle her wrongful death claim for $8,000. Snowden
requested that the insurer contribute $5,000 to the settlement. When
the insurer refused, Snowden made full settlement of the claim and
proceeded to sue the insurer for reimbursement. The court held that
where an insurer "assumes the duty of defending or settling suits
against the insured, this obligation is one requiring due care and a
strict performance in utmost good faith. ' '3 ' The insurer was liable for
any damage to the insured resulting from a bad faith refusal of the
insurer to compromise the claim involved. The court noted that
"[w]hile the insured is generally prohibited from making a settlement
of a claim under policies giving that right to the insurer, a different
rule obtains where the insurer itself, in bad faith, breaches the contract
by arbitrarily refusing to settle."' 37 Accordingly, the court awarded
Snowden recovery against the insurer in the amount of $5,000.
The Arkansas court and others adopting the doctrine of good faith
and fair dealing in third party cases did not, in the earlier cases, care-
fully distinguish between a cause of action sounding in tort and one
sounding in contract.3 8 California courts took the lead in enunciating
the principles of a tort cause of action in insurance cases.39 In the 1958
case of Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.,40 the California
court considered the question of extra-contractual recovery by a third
party claimant following a refusal by the insurer to settle a claim
within the policy limits. The insured had assigned his rights under the
34. Schencke Piano v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., 216 N.Y. 662, 110 N.E. 1049 (1915);
Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N.W. 1081 (1916).
35. 223 Ark. 64, 264 S.W.2d 642 (1954).
36. Id. at 70, 264 S.W.2d at 645 (quoting 29 AM. JUR. Insurance § 1077 (1940)).
37. Id.
38. The Arkansas court in Snowden limited recovery to the amount of the policy coverage. It
should be noted that Justice Millwee, writing for the court in Snowden, apparently held the view
that Snowden should have been allowed to recover the full $8,533.85 judgment. Id. at 71, 264
S.W.2d at 646.
39. See generally Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13
PAc. L. J. 833 (1982).
40. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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policy to the third party claimant who had obtained a judgment against
the insured. The court held that in every insurance contract there is an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which obligates the in-
surer to refrain from any act that might injure the right of the insured
to receive the benefits of the agreement.41 Breach of this covenant, the
court said, gives rise to a cause of action not only in contract but in tort
as well, allowing the insured to choose between recovery based on con-
tract or tort damages."'
Recognition of the tort basis for awarding extra-contractual recov-
ery was important in the subsequent California case of Crisci v. Secur-
ity Insurance Co.' In Crisci, the court allowed recovery against an
insurer not only of the $101,000 verdict against its insured, but also
$25,000 for her mental suffering, which resulted from wrongful refusal
of the insurer to settle within the policy limits. 44
The Arkansas court also has made it clear that the cause of action
for extra-contractual damages in a third party claim case is one sound-
ing in tort. In Tri-State Insurance Co. v. Busby,' the court considered
an appeal by the insurer from a lower court judgment awarding extra-
contractual damages to its insured following a wrongful refusal by the
insurer to settle a claim within the policy limits. Citing its earlier hold-
ing in Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hardin" for
the proposition that a third party claim sounds in tort, rather than in
contract, the court noted that "[t]here we said: '[t]he action is one in
tort and interest should be allowed only from the date of the judgment
in the case at bar.' 47
California became the first jurisdiction 48 to extend the tort of bad
41. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
42. Id. at 663, 328 P.2d at 203.
43. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
44. The court in Crisci noted that
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 was mainly con-
cerned with the contract aspect of the action. This may be due to the facts that the tort
duty is ordinarily based on the insurer's assumption of the defense and of settlement
negotiations [citations deleted] and that in Comunale the insurer did not undertake
defense or settlement but denied coverage. In any event Comunale expressly recognizes
that "wrongful refusal to settle has generally been treated as a tort."
Id. at 432 n.3, 426 P.2d at 178 n.3, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18 n.3 (1967).
45. 251 Ark. 568, 473 S.W.2d 893 (1971).
46. 233 Ark. 1011, 351 S.W.2d 153 (1961).
47. 251 Ark. at 572, 473 S.W.2d at 896.
48. Earlier California cases, while discussing such an extension, based their holdings for the
insured in a first party claim case, on grounds different from the bad faith cause of action. See,
e.g., Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal Rptr. 764 (1968)
(fraudulent misrepresentation); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89
[Vol. 7:671
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faith from third party to first party cases in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insur-
ance Co.49 This case involved a claim to indemnity under the terms of a
fire insurance policy. The insurer refused to settle the claim and gave
reports to the police which falsely implied that Gruenberg had been
guilty of arson. As a consequence, Gruenberg, who was attempting to
avoid arrest on the criminal charge, was unable to appear for an exami-
nation under oath as required by the terms of his insurance policy.6 0
When the insurer denied coverage, citing this breach of the policy
terms, Gruenberg filed suit alleging that the insurer's bad faith refusal
to settle the claim resulted in the loss of his business and infliction of
emotional distress.5' The court held that an insurer which unreasonably
fails to pay benefits owing to an insured under the policy terms thereby
breaches an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, making the
insurer liable for the commission of an independent tort of bad faith, 52
which permits the insured to recover both compensatory and punitive
damages.53
The Arkansas Supreme Court first considered the tort of bad faith
in a first party context in Findley v. Time Insurance Co.54 In Findley,
the plaintiff sued her insurer alleging a bad faith refusal to pay benefits
under a major medical insurance policy. Specifically, the insured al-
leged that the insurer had failed to explain its refusal to pay benefits,
had failed to investigate the claim fully, and had failed to contact the
plaintiff or her physician.55 While discussing the evolving new tort of
bad faith, the court in Findley was able to avoid the issue because the
plaintiff's complaint did "not assert any affirmative action on the part
of the defendant that would constitute bad faith .... -5' The court
concluded that although it did not rule out the possibility of a separate
cause of action in tort, "[s]uch questions we leave to the future. 657 The
bad faith tort was not recognized until six years later in Aetna Casu-
alty and Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp.58
Not all courts which have recognized the tort of bad faith in a
Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) (intentional infliction of emotional distress). See supra note 31.
49. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
50. See id. at 571, 510 P.2d at 1035, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
51. Id. at 572, 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
52. Id. at 581, 510 P.2d at 1042, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
53. Id. at 580, 510 P.2d at 1041, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
54. 264 Ark. 647, 573 S.W.2d 908 (1978).
55. Id. at 652-53, 573 S.W.2d at 910-11.
56. Id. at 653, 573 S.W.2d at 911.
57. Id. at 655, 573 S.W.2d at 912.
58. 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984).
1984]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
third party action have been willing to extend the cause of action to
first party cases."' Such courts reason that the bad faith theory of re-
covery should be applied only in third party cases, 0 pointing out that
in a third party liability case, the insurer and its insured stand in a
fiduciary relationship. The insurer has complete control over the de-
fense of a lawsuit filed against its insured by the third party claimant.
In this situation, the failure of the insurer to accept a reasonable offer
of settlement could result in a judgment against the insured which is in
excess of the policy coverage.61 In first party cases, however, the insurer
and the insured are essentially in an adversarial stance6' 2-the insured
claiming he is owed money under the policy, the insurer claiming that
he is not.
Other courts have rejected the tort of bad faith on grounds that
certain statutory remedies have preempted the field, dispensing with
the need for any separate remedy in tort.63 Thirty-two jurisdictions,6'
including Arkansas,6 have statutes patterned after the Model Unfair
Trade Practices Act,66 which sets out certain insurance practices as
prohibited and provides that violation of the Act may result in adminis-
59. See Karp, supra note 26, at 83.
60. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980)
(discussion of the distinctions to be made between third and first party bad faith). See also Leo-
nard v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 100 Ga. App. 434, il S.E.2d 773 (1959); Craig v. Iowa Kemper
Mutual Ins. Co., 565 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co.,
118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 278 Or. 53, 562 P.2d
965 (1977).
61. See Baxter v. Royal Indem. Co., 285 So.2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
62. Id. at 656.
63. See Best, Statutes and Regulations Controlling Life and Health Insurance Claim Prac-
tices, 29 DEFENSE L.J. 115 (1980); and Best, Statutes and Regulations Controlling Life and
Health Insurance Claim Practices-An Update, 31 DEFENSE L.J. 93 (1982) for an excellent com-
pilation of information on the various statutory regulation schemes and their effects on insurance.
64. See Best, Statutes and Regulations Controlling Life and Health Insurance Claim Prac-
tices, 29 DEFENSE L.J. 115, 117-18 (1980) (includes a description of the deviations in each juris-
diction from the MODEL UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (National Ass'n of Ins. Commissioners
1947)).
65. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-3002 to -3014 (1980). Section 66-3005(9) describes the trade
practices for which sanctions may be imposed. Section 66-3012 establishes the penalties which
may be assessed against an insurer who violates a cease and desist order from the Commissioner,
as authorized in §66-3008. The section was amended in 1981 to increase the maximum penalties
from $5,000 to $10,000. ARK. STAT. ANN. §66-3012(a) (Supp. 1983).
66. The MODEL UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (National Ass'n of Ins. Commissioners
1947) was promulgated in response to the 1945 Congressional enactment of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1011 to -1015 (1982)),
which placed responsibility upon the states for regulation of the insurance industry. See Best,
supra note 64, at I 17. For a brief history and discussion of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Lent,
McCarran-Ferguson in Perspective, 48 INS. COUNSEL J.. 411 (1981).
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trative penalties to be imposed by a commissioner of insurance. Courts
in several states have construed these provisions for administrative pen-
alties as evidence of a legislative intent to establish an exclusive remedy
for an insurer's unfair or unreasonable trade practices.6 7 Interestingly,
other state courts have held that the Unfair Trade Practices Act,
rather than precluding an action in tort, actually creates a private
cause of action against the insurer.6 8 It should be noted that the Arkan-
sas Trade Practices Act was amended in 1981 expressly to disclaim any
legislative intent for or against either statutory preemption or creation
of a private cause of action. 9
In addition to administrative penalties, several states,70 including
Arkansas,7 1 have specific penalty and fees statutes which award an ex-
tra-contractual recovery to the insured in cases involving certain pro-
hibited claim practices. A number of jurisdictions have held that such
statutory remedies preempt the cause of action in tort.72 Conversely,
several states have rejected the insurer's claim that the statutory rem-
edy preempts the bad faith tort.73
67. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 227 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149
(1980), where the court said, "The legislature has provided several remedies for an aggrieved
insured and has dealt with the question of good faith first-party claims . . . Where the legislature
has provided such detailed and effective remedies, we find it undesirable for us to expand those
remedies by judicial decree." 227 Kan. at 926, 611 P.2d at 158. See also Duncan v. Andrew
County Mut. Ins. Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978).
68. See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (1979); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 280 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1981). Other
jurisdictions have held that the statute does not create a private cause of action. Farris v. U.S.
Fidelity and Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978); Wilder v. Aetna Life and Casualty
Ins. Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309 (1981); Kranzush v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co., 103
Wis. 2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981).
69. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3002(2) (Supp. 1983).
70. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 767 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:657 (West 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (Vernon Supp.
1984); TENN CODE ANN. § 56-7-105 (Supp. 1983); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.62 (Vernon 1981);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 636.10 (West 1980).
71. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1980) provides that failure to pay a claim within the time
specified in the policy after demand is made will expose the insurer to liability, beyond the con-
tractual benefits due, in the amount of 12% of the contractual benefits due, in addition to attor-
ney's fees.
72. See, e.g., Associated Photographers, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 677 F.2d 1251
(8th Cir. 1982) (interpreting Missouri law); Tate v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 149 Ga. App.
123, 253 S.E.2d 775 (1979); Tano Corp. v. Louisiana Health Serv. and Indem. Co., 355 So.2d
604 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Farris v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d
1015 (1978); Smith v. Harleysville Ins. Co. 275 Pa. Super. 246, 418 A.2d 705 (1980).
73. See, e.g. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978);
Lynch v. Mid-America Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 94 Il1. App. 3d 21, 418 N.E.2d 421 (1981)
(abandoned a position taken just two years earlier in Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 III. App. 3d
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The first Arkansas case to raise the preemption question was MFA
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Keller,74 where the court expressly reserved
the issue.75 In 1980, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case
arising in Arkansas, observed that "[a]pparently the view is slowly
spreading that states will have either the bad faith tort or the statutory
penalty, but not both."'76 Despite this conjecture, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court in Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms
Corp. 7 , held, as previously noted, that the statutory remedies provided
by the Trade Practices Act and the Arkansas penalty and fees statute
do not preempt the bad faith tort action.
Arkansas's penalty and fees statute7 8 differs from those of a num-
ber of states79 in that the statute provides for a penalty for late pay-
ment regardless of the existence of reasonable cause in denying the
claim.80 The Arkansas statute penalizes the insurer for failing to pay a
claim within the time specified in the policy after demand is made.81 In
Louisiana, the failure to pay must be without reasonable cause;82 in
Illinois, the penalty is awarded only for vexatious and unreasonable de-
lay; 83 in Georgia8" and in Tennessee85 bad faith is required for assess-
ment of the penalty; and in Missouri, a penalty is imposed only for
unreasonable refusal to pay.86 It has been argued that the absence in
the Arkansas statute of any reference to bad faith or unreasonable be-
havior on the part of the insurer is evidence that the legislature did not
intend the penalty and fees statute to preempt an action in tort.8 7 Ten-
nessee courts, despite a statute which contains a requirement of bad
faith as a basis for the penalty,88 have recognized an independent bad
faith cause of action.89
57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1979)).
74. 274 Ark. 281, 623 S.W.2d 841 (1981).
75. Id. at 286, 623 S.W.2d at 843.
76. Robinson v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 497, 501 n.5 (8th Cir. 1980).
77. 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984).
78. See supra note 71.
79. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
80. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3238 (1980).
81. Id.
82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:657 (West 1978).
83. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §767 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982).
84. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (1982).
85. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105 (Supp. 1984).
86. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
87. Abstract and Brief for Appellant at 28, Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms
Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984).
88. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105 (Supp. 1984).
89. See MFA Mutual Ins. Co. v. Flint, 574 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn. 1978); Brown v. St. Paul
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This same diversity of approaches characterizes the court opinions
which have set out the elements of the tort.90 In considering the stan-
dards which courts have applied in holding an insurer liable under a
bad faith theory, it is again important to distinguish between third and
first party cases. In the third party actions, the tort ranges from negli-
gence in some jurisdictions91 to something very much like strict liability
in others. 92 In the context of first party actions, however, some courts
have adopted a reasonableness test 93 while others have insisted upon a
showing of malicious, oppressive or dishonest conduct indicative of an
intentional tort. 4
The Arkansas Supreme Court also has established a dichotomy be-
tween first and third party claims. In the third party setting, the Ar-
kansas court has adopted a standard which equates negligence with bad
faith. In Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Parker,95
the insurer appealed a lower court award of damages for its failure to
settle a claim against its insured which was within the policy limits.
The insurer argued that liability in a third party claim action should
not be predicated upon negligence alone.96 The Arkansas Supreme
Court, in affirming the lower court said that the insured could be held
liable under either theory, noting that "[s]ome courts allow recovery on
the rule of 'bad faith', while other courts allow recovery on the less
stringent rule of negligence. We see no occasion to align Arkansas ex-
clusively with either of these. .. .
This "either-or" approach was followed in Tri-State Insurance Co.
v. Busby,98 where the court said, "[I]t is well established in our state
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 604 S.W.2d 863 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). Note, however, that neither of
these cases expressly deal with the issue of statutory preemption.
90. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Dumas v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1947);
Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co., 152 Tex. 534, 260 S.W.2d 884 (1952).
92. See, e.g., Johansen v. California State Automobile Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal.3d 9,
538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
93. See, e.g., Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
"The tort of bad faith can be alleged only if the facts pleaded would, on the basis of an objective
standard, show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim, i.e., would a reasonable
insurer under the circumstances have denied or delayed payment of the claims under the facts and
circumstances." Id. at 692, 271 N.W.2d at 377. See also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975).
94. See, e.g., Amsden v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972);
State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798 (1975).
95. 232 Ark. 841, 341 S.W.2d 36 (1960).
96. Id. at 846, 341 S.W.2d at 39.
97. Id. at 846, 341 S.W.2d at 40.
98. 251 Ark. 568, 473 S.W.2d 893 (1971).
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that an insurer is liable to its insured for any judgment in excess of the
insured's policy limits if the insurer's failure to settle the claim was due
to fraud, bad faith, or negligence." 99 In Members Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Blissett,100 the court permitted an insured to recover for a negli-
gent failure of the company to settle a claim against its insured.
By contrast, the court has made it clear that negligence or misfea-
sance is insufficient to establish the tort of bad faith in first party ac-
tions. Affirmative misconduct which is malicious, oppressive or dishon-
est is required.101
Although the standards for judging whether an insurer's conduct
amounted to bad faith may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there
is greater agreement among the courts as to the elements necessary to
sustain an award of punitive damages once the bad faith tort has been
established. Even in those jurisdictions applying a reasonableness test
for bad faith an award of punitive damages requires that the plaintiff
prove more than breach of a duty of good faith.'0 2 A showing of op-
pression, fraud or malice on the part of the insurer is required for an
award of punitive damages.'
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp.04 made
it clear that in Arkansas a showing of malicious, oppressive or dishon-
est conduct by the insurer is essential to establish a prima facie case in
a first party action. The court specifically rejected the notion that negli-
gence or bad judgment on the part of the insurer would suffice to show
bad faith. 0 5 In a separate opinion, 0 6 Justice Hickman noted that, al-
though the majority's formulation of the test for bad faith imposed "a
heavy burden on an insured,"' 07 he would go further and "characterize
the new tort as outrage, because it better describes the kind of conduct
99. Id. at 569, 472 S.W.2d at 894.
100. 254 Ark. 211, 492 S.W.2d 429 (1973).
101. Findley v. Time Ins. Co., 264 Ark. 647, 573 S.W.2d 908 (1978).
102. See cases cited supra note 60.
103. See, e.g., Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis.2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368 (1978).
"For punitive damages to be awarded, a defendant must not only intentionally have breached his
duty of good faith, but in addition must have been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice .. " Id.
at 686, 271 N.W.2d at 379. See also Lynch v. Mid-America Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 94 111.
App. 3d 21, 418 N.E.2d 421 (1981). "No case has been called to our attention holding that
evidence supporting an award of compensatory damages for an insurer's failure to settle the claim
in good faith necessarily supports an award for punitive damages." Id. at 28, 418 N.E.2d at 428.
Accord, Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D.
1979); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980).
104. 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984).
105. Id. at 133, 664 S.W.2d at 465.
106. Id. at 138, 664 S.W.2d at 468.
107. Id. at 139, 664 S.W.2d at 468.
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that should result in punishment."' 0 8 He expressed concern that "bad
faith" could well be interpreted by jurors as mere negligence when
"this tort is not one of negligence - it is one of intentional malicious,
dishonest and oppressive conduct."' 0 9 Justice Hickman concluded that
the evidence presented in the case was insufficient to show outrageous
conduct on the party of Aetna. °
Although the court affirmed the feasibility of an action in tort
based on bad faith, it nevertheless reversed the judgment of the trial
court, finding error on several points. The court first dispensed with
Aetna's claim that the provisions of the Trade Practices Act and the
penalty and fees statute preempt the cause of action in tort. The court
noted that such an interpretation of the statutory provisions was erro-
neous because neither of the statutory remedies deals with the problem
of bad faith. 1 ' Further, the the court noted that interpreting the stat-
utes as providing for an exclusive remedy would rule out third party
claims of bad faith since "the Trade Practices Act is only an effort to
clean up undesirable conduct of insurers and the penalty and fees stat-
ute applies only to first party claims.""' 2
Justice Purtle, writing for the court, then considered Aetna's ob-
jection to a jury instruction concerning the Trade Practices Act. The
Act sets out certain practices of an insurer which will be considered
"unfair" and provides for the assessment of administrative penalties in
the event of a violation." 3 In reading the applicable portions of the
statute to the jury, the trial judge omitted a prefatory section of the
statute which states, "[C]ommitting or performing with such frequency
as to indicate a general business practice, any of the following..."I"
will be considered an unfair practice. Because the trial judge omitted
what the court characterized as "a vital portion of the statute, ' " 5 and
because the judge improperly stated that violation of the statute was
evidence of bad faith, the court upheld Aetna's objections to the jury
instructions.
After reviewing Broadway Arms' three specific allegations of bad
faith, the court held that, as a matter of law, the evidence did not sus-
tain the finding that Aetna acted dishonestly, maliciously or oppres-
108. Id. at 139, 664 S.W.2d at 469.
109. Id. at 140, 664 S.W.2d at 469.
110. Id.
I1. Id. at 133, 664 S.W.2d at 465.
112. Id.
113. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3012 (1980).
114. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(9) (1980).
115. Aetna, 281 Ark. at 135, 664 S.W.2d at 466.
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sively in its handling of the salvage dispute.' 16 On the question of the
alleged threat by Aetna to report Broadway Arms' insurance claim to
the IRS, 1 7 the court directed the trial court to determine upon remand
whether such a threat constituted bad faith on the part of the
insurer." 18
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp. is signif-
icant in several respects. First, the opinion clearly established the via-
bility of the bad faith cause of action in a first party context. The 1978
opinion in Findley v. Time Insurance Co.,119 referred to the tort only in
dicta and left unanswered the question of whether the court would in
fact recognize the tort.120
Second, the opinion indicates that the Arkansas court will insist
upon truly egregious conduct on the part of an insurer as a prerequisite
to imposition of liability in tort. Although other jurisdictions have per-
mitted the assessment of extra-contractual damages upon a showing of
conduct which might be called aggravated negligence," Aetna rejected
the negligence standard.
While some commentators have questioned the wisdom of ex-
tending the bad faith cause of action from third to first party cases, 2'
the Arkansas formulation of the tort seems likely to have a beneficial
impact. Although the insurance industry as a whole has regarded the
bad faith tort as a malevolent invention of fee-hungry lawyers,1 23 it is
doubtful whether the Arkansas formula, as announced in Aetna, will
seriously disturb the conscientious insurer.
Finally, Aetna is important because it soundly rejected the conten-
tion that the penalties provided by statute for refusal by an insurer to
pay a claim or the administrative sanctions permissible under the
Trade Practices Act, preempt the cause of action in tort. The issue is
more important than the court's cursory treatment in Aetna might im-
116. Id. at 134, 664 S.W.2d at 466.
117. See Supplemental Abstract and Brief for Appellee at 44-46, Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128, 664 S.W.2d 463 (1984).
118. Aetna, 281 Ark. at 134, 664 S.W.2d at 466.
119. 264 Ark. 647, 573 S.W.2d 908 (1978).
120. Id. at 655, 573 S.W.2d at 911.
121. See supra note 93.
122. See, e.g., Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13
PAC. L.J. 833, 853-54 (1982). But see Levinson, Thoughts on Trying a Plaintiffs Extracontrac-
tual Damages Case, A.B.A. SEC. TORT AND INS. PRACTICE 139 (1983). For an excellent synopsis
of the strategies to be employed both by plaintiff's and defendant's counsel in insurance bad faith
cases, see EXTRACONTRACTUAL DAMAGES (J. Groves ed. 1983).
123. See, e.g., Parks and Heil, Insurers Beware: "Bad Faith" is in Full Bloom, 9 FORUM 63
(1973).
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ply. In fact, numerous jurisdictions have accepted the idea that the
statutory enactments regulating industry practices provide an exclusive
remedy for carrier misconduct.2" Major portions of both sides' briefs
in Aetna were devoted to the issue.1 25
Aetna made it clear that the Arkansas court has set a high stan-
dard for proof of a prima facie bad faith cause of action. Nevertheless,
the prospect of punitive damages, which is an integral part of the "new
tort," gives good reason for counsel on both sides of insurance cases to
be watchful. Although Aetna sketched a broad outline, more definitive
boundaries of the bad faith tort are yet to be established.
Chet Roberts
124. See cases cited supra notes 67, 72.
125. See Abstract and Brief for Appellant at 237-48 and Supplemental Abstract and Brief
for Appellee at 25-36, Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 281 Ark. 128,
664 S.W.2d 463 (1984).
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